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employer relative to an otherwise-identical, own-race one? We run a well-powered, model-based ex-
periment wherein we recruit 6,000 workers from Amazon’s M-Turk platform for a real-effort task and
randomly (and unobtrusively) reveal to them the racial identity of their non-fictitious employer. Strik-
ingly, we find strong evidence of race-based altruism – white workers, even when they do not benefit
personally, work relatively harder to generate more income for black employers. Self-declared white
Republicans and Independents exhibit significantly more altruism relative to Democrats. Notably, the
altruism does not seem to be driven by race-specific beliefs about the income status of the employers.
Our results suggest the possibility that pro-social behavior of whites toward blacks, atypical in tradi-
tional labor markets, may emerge in the gig economy where associative (dis)taste is naturally muted
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1 Introduction
By construction, Homo economicus is self-interested and only takes actions that maximize his/her pay-
offs. By way of contrast, Homo behavioralis, in addition to being self-interested is also endowed with
social preferences, a concern for how his/her actions affect the payoffs of others. These “others” could
belong to his in-group, a group he identifies with and whose membership gives him a sense of belong-
ing. Everyone else, by definition, is in his out-group. Homo behavioralis may harbor negative social
preferences urging him to discriminate against others; or the preferences could be positive and take
the form of prosocial behavior – actions taken with an intent to benefit others with no expectation of
personal benefit.
This paper is aimed at detecting evidence of positive or negative social preferences within the
context of labor markets. The experimental setting is an U.S. based online labor market (loosely, “gig
economy”) and group identity is assumed to be racial in origin. Within this environment, we ask, is
there evidence that whites systematically treat blacks differently from how they treat fellow whites? We
depart from a half-century of research in labor economics that views this issue largely as unidirectional,
emanating from employers and directed toward their employees.1 Instead, we ask, is there evidence
that white workers in the gig economy treat their black employers better or worse than how they treat
their otherwise-identical, white employers?
A series of questions come up right away. Why is it interesting to study discrimination or pro-social
behavior of workers toward employers? Is there any evidence of this? And, why the gig economy? We
take these up one by one. That workers may treat their out-race employers differently may, at first
glance, seem implausible; after all, it is mostly bosses who get to frame labor contracts and surely
within the bounds of such contracts there cannot be much room left for workers to mistreat out-group
bosses. Our view is that this first-pass line of thinking is limited. While admittedly it is easier for
bosses to maltreat out-group workers, the latter are also keenly aware that the effort they put in, the
diligence or care they show on the job, crucially affects the bottomline of their bosses. Moreover,
as is well known, labor contracts are often “incomplete”: they leave workers a considerable degree
of discretion over work effort. It is therefore conceivable that a worker with substantial leeway over
effort makes very different effort choices reflecting his underlying differential social preferences. For
instance, a black worker may choose to work harder for a black boss because of his desire to a) see his
boss succeed even if it does not benefit him personally (altruism à la Simon (1993)), and b) return any
respect or kindness he receives from his boss (reciprocity à la Akerlof (1982)).
Second, there is important evidence that workers care about the social identity of their bosses and
differentially perform for in versus out-group employers. Sundstrom (1994), focusing on U.S. urban
labor markets 1910-1950, notes “one of the most widely noted rules of the southern labor market was
1See Riach and Rich (2002), Charles and Guryan (2011), Rich (2014), Bertrand and Duflo (2017), and Neumark (2018) for a
review of this literature.
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that blacks were not to supervise whites...[because it] would plainly invert the appropriate hierarchy”
which meant “blacks were generally absent from supervisory positions”. White employees simply did
not wish to receive orders from (or work under) black supervisors. More recently, Glover, Pallais, and
Pariente (2017) study whether discriminatory beliefs held by bosses directly affect minority workers’
job performance in a real-world workplace. They investigate the performance of cashiers in a French
grocery store chain, and find when “minority cashiers, but not majority cashiers, are scheduled to work
with managers who are biased (as determined by an Implicit Association Test), they are absent more
often, spend less time at work, scan items more slowly, and take more time between customers.” The
upshot is, workers do adjust their effort based on the social identity of their bosses, and may perform
better when paired with own-group managers than out-group ones.2
And why study this question in the confines of the gig economy? To be clear, a gig economy is one
where independent workers are paid by the gig (i.e., for a task or a project) as opposed to the tradi-
tional economy where workers are paid a salary or hourly wage as part of a contract. One important
distinction is that in the gig economy, particularly of the digital-platform type, there is little scope for
close or repeated interactions between the employer and the employee; hence, associative distaste or
liking is unlikely to be activated.3 This means, if we are to detect any race-based differences in social
preferences (altruism or reciprocity) in our gig economy setting, it will not be because of associative
distaste or liking. Another critical difference is the vastly dissimilar “power dynamic” between worker
and boss. In a gig economy, workers retain a lot of power in the worker-employer relationship: they
may shirk under a particular employer or easily switch employers without losing much “employment
rent”.4 This new power dynamic makes the gig economy an ideal setting to study worker-to-boss dis-
crimination, much more so than the conventional labor market setting.5’6
To the end of answering our research question, we run a well-powered, AEA preregistered, model-
based experiment using 6,000 white subjects from one of the largest gig economy platforms: Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (M-Turk).7 Specifically, our experimental design uses U.S. based subjects from M-
2Oh (2019) finds that 43% of Indian workers “refuse to spend ten minutes working on tasks associated with other castes, even
when offered ten times their daily wage” suggesting the important role of social identity in determining work-related decisions.
3While our work is focused on an online labor market, others such as TaskRabbit offer tasks situated in the physical world
and cover household errands and skilled tasks such as minor home repairs, assembling Ikea furniture, where the scope for more
interaction between worker and boss, and hence, more associative (dis) taste, is clearly higher.
4After all, a typical Uber driver (or a M-Turker), each a worker, may work for ten “employers” in a day and ten different ones
the very next day!
5Allport (1954) classic The Nature of Prejudice, (Chapter 16 ‘The Effect of Contact’) argued for bringing members of different
groups together in face-to-face encounters to reduce inter-group hostility. Significantly, he was of the view that direct inter-group
contact would effectively reduce out-group prejudice if it involved equal status among the participants. We posit that the gig
economy allows the worker and the employer to be of “equal status” and that, in and of itself, may reduce inter-group hostility
even when no direct contact à la Allport is initiated.
6There are ancillary reasons why our focus on the gig economy is pertinent. The argument is often made that blacks, often
the victim of discrimination in conventional labor markets, would gravitate to the gig economy because of reduced expectations
of discrimination in the latter. We would want to know, are those expectations likely to be satisfied? Also, other than Cook,
Diamond, Hall, List, and Oyer (2019), it is not known whether long-established routes of discrimination researched on traditional
labor markets with conventional worker-boss power dynamics will continue to operate in the dawning gig economy.
7Roughly 50% of M-Turkers are from the United States. Based on 2015 data, about 77% are non-Hispanic white and only 6%
are non-Hispanic black (Hitlin, 2016). The results reported below are for U.S.-based white workers, by far the vast majority of
workers on M-Turk and in our sample.
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Turk (recruited as “workers”) and black and white student subjects (recruited as “employers”) from
a major U.S. public university. The interaction between a worker and an employer is kept one-shot,
as is typical in the gig economy, so that confounding reputation effects (of the kind that naturally
emerge in Glover et al. (2017)) do not enter. In the experiment, workers engage in a real-effort task
for a pre-assigned, non-fictitious employer. The real-effort task (unlike monetized costs in studies such
as Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007); Fershtman and Gneezy (2001)) entails a real utility cost of
effort because it requires a worker to alternately press the ‘a’ and ‘b’ buttons on a keyboard for up to 10
minutes. Workers do not get to select their employer but are free to decide how much effort to provide
on the task (an ‘incomplete contract’ environment). 8 The worker’s performance is measured by the
number of times the buttons are alternately pressed, and the worker is informed (truthfully) of the
payoff the employer will receive due to the worker’s performance. Race-dependent social preferences
are potentially activated in some treatments by unobtrusively revealing the employer’s race to the
matched worker.
The design is tightly connected to a simple structural model à la DellaVigna, List, Malmendier,
and Rao (2016), in which workers have race-dependent social preferences towards their employer and
maximize utility from the provision of costly effort. Inspired by Doleac and Stein (2013), we take the
approach of revealing race indirectly via the revelation of skin color and voice: employer-subjects are
videotaped while they read off a script explaining and demonstrating the task for the workers. The
camera placement only captures the hand of the employer along with the movement of the fingers
alternating ‘a’ and ‘b’ button presses. Other identifiers, such as the face, are not revealed. This allows
us to reveal or conceal race without sacrificing either privacy or anonymity. In the neutral treatments,
gloves and other clothing hide the skin entirely. The worker is aware of being matched to an employer
but is unaware of any identity clues. We make every effort to check that race, when revealed, is
correctly perceived. In the experiment, we introduce a total of ten treatment variations. In the first
three, we vary the piece rate with an aim to identify and estimate the cost-of-effort function. Here, the
worker is not given any information about the existence of (non-existent) employer; any earnings from
his/her effort choices go entirely to the worker. The next set of three treatments aim to a) detect the
baseline level of altruism towards the hidden race of the employer (altruism netural) and b) estimate
race-specific altruism towards the revealed race of the employer (altruism black and altruism white).
The final treatments are designed to a) detect the baseline level of reciprocity towards the hidden race
of the employer (reciprocity neutral) and b) estimate the race-specific variations in reciprocity towards
the revealed race of the employer (reciprocity black and reciprocity white). Thus, the ten treatments
8Traditionally, discrimination in labor markets is understood to arise in two main ways. Becker (1957) introduced the notion
of taste-based discrimination postulating that discrimination exists because of a prejudice/animus towards the members of the
disadvantaged group. On the other hand, Phelps (1972) theorized that discrimination might be statistical – an employer, lacking
information about a job-seeker’s productivity, forms beliefs about it based on the person’s group identity and the aggregate
productivity distribution of the group to which the person belongs. In our experiment, the employers do not get to make any
strategic choices (such as wage offers, payments, minutes of work, work times, etc.). This eliminates most channels for statistical
discrimination by workers.
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help us identify the cost-of-effort function and social-preference parameters (altruism and reciprocity)
of the structural model separately for neutral (hidden race), black, and white employers.
Our findings reported in terms of average effort by white workers are as follows. First, not surpris-
ingly, incentives via piece rates have a strong, statistically-significant effect on effort. Second, as in
DellaVigna and Pope (2018), we detect statistically significant evidence for altruism: workers put more
effort when they know their work benefits an employer of unknown race (“altruism-neutral treatment”)
as compared to the piece rate 0-cent treatment where neither the worker nor the employer earns any
payoff attributable to worker effort. Parenthetically, there is no evidence of reciprocity.
Strikingly, white workers are significantly more altruistic towards black employers than white em-
ployers – categorically, they do not discriminate against their black employers. In addition to being
statistically significant at the 2% level, the difference in effort provision is non-trivial. To see this, con-
sider a baseline level of altruism, defined as the differential effort provided by white workers knowing
their effort enhances the payoff of an unknown race employer versus their effort when the piece rate is
0-cent and no employer exists. Our results indicate that the differential effort by white workers know-
ing their effort enhances the payoff of a white vs. a black employer is 75% of this baseline. Also, the
differential effort by workers knowing their effort enhances the payoff of a black vs. an unknown-race
employer is 45% of the baseline. The structural estimation exercise also reveals that black employers
get 5% more effort than white employers at a 0-piece rate. Collectively, these represent persuasive
evidence of pro-social behavior by whites toward black employers.
What explains this pro-social behavior? Is it racial heterophily? Is it “white guilt”? We did not
collect data from M-Turk workers on any measure of racial bias such as the Implicit Association Test
(IAT).9 However, we combined IAT data from Project Implicit with county-level knowledge of worker
residence. We find that the pro-social response towards black employers is partially driven by workers
from areas with low implicit bias against blacks. Peeking further, we find if we split the IAT data into
two halves (top and bottom), the pro-black altruism is highly significant for workers in the bottom half –
those residing in the “least racist” counties – and is insignificant for those in the top half.10 We also test
(albeit, somewhat crudely) and reject the hypothesis that the differentially altruistic response toward
black employers is driven by worker beliefs about the income status of their employers. Interestingly,
we find workers who are self-declared Republicans and Independents exert significantly more effort for
their black employers as compared to Democrats.
9Perhaps the most well known measure of racial bias is the Implicit Association Test (IAT) which measures the “strength of
association between categories such as European American versus African-American and words such as joy, laughter, and happy
versus hurt, evil, and awful that represent categories of good versus bad.” Upwards of 80% of whites in nationally representative
American samples have shown an implicit preference for whites over blacks (Triplett, 2012).
10It is tempting to draw conclusions about “white guilt”, a supposedly collective guilt felt by whites for their group’s actions
toward blacks, not necessarily for their own actions. As Chudy, Piston, and Shipper (2019) point out “...whites who hold collective
guilt acknowledge that their group is responsible for black suffering and that the inter-group relationship needs to be repaired.”
Just because someone lives in a county where an average person registers low animus toward African Americans in an IAT test
does not mean such people will wish to do something to repair the aforementioned inter-group relationship. In our case, though,
unlike research that relies on survey-based measures of white guilt, we are able to detect evidence of whites doing something
extra for blacks even when they do not need to.
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In terms of the value-added to the literature, our primary contribution is to showcase the impor-
tance of looking at the worker-to-employer social preference angle. Our finding is interesting because
it raises the possibility that positive social preference toward blacks, rarely detected in traditional
labor markets, may emerge in environments such as the gig economy where associative distaste is
naturally muted. Bear in mind, ours is a well-powered, AEA pre-registered experiment which would
have detected preference-based discrimination had it existed on the M-Turk platform; the fact we don’t
is encouraging, seeing how the gig economy is expanding (Katz & Krueger, 2019). Further, it is oft-
repeated that the relative lack of success of black-owned businesses or the diminished presence of
blacks in leadership positions in the United States is a major concern among policy makers; more so,
because “business ownership has historically been a route of economic advancement for disadvantaged
groups” (Fairlie & Robb, 2007). Our study can offer a partial answer in the negative to the following
question: do entrepreneurial blacks shy away from business because they rationally fear discrimination
by majority white workers? Curiously, our finding also shuts down another line of thinking connected to
the issue of anticipation of discrimination. There is considerable evidence that employer-to-employee
discrimination is mostly taste-based.11 What if it is being miss-classified? What if an employer dis-
criminates against his out-race workers because he rationally believes/anticipates being discriminated
against by them? In that case, the employer-to- employee discrimination ought to be characterized as
statistical. Within the confines of our environment, our finding that workers do not discriminate against
their out-race employers essentially shuts down any rational expectation of bias an employer may have.
Incorrect beliefs may persist, though (Bohren et al., 2019).
Our research is related to an emerging literature in economics studying discrimination by subor-
dinates (Abel, 2019; Ayalew, Manian, & Sheth, 2018; Chakraborty & Serra, 2019; Grossman, Eckel,
Komai, & Zhan, 2019). This literature focuses on gender as group identity and mostly finds belief-
based discrimination against female leaders. Another study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk by Abel
(2019) finds that workers do not discriminate in effort choices when they work for women leaders, even
though the feedback from them is perceived as being less pleasant than from a male leader. Ours is
the first to investigate the possibility of race-based discrimination by subordinates in the U.S. Evidence
from Benson, Board, and Meyer-ter Vehn (2019) suggests that workers’ performance is influenced by
the social identity of their boss. They chalk it to the fact that bosses can better screen applicants from
their own race. Our study shuts down this “selection effect” and yet finds no evidence of race-based
discrimination by workers. Our result, along with that in Abel (2019), reaffirms our conclusion that
worker-to-boss discrimination is less likely to elicit itself in a gig economy.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model of behavior and
produce the treatments to identify the parameters of interest. In Section 3, we present the experiment
11Indeed, 97% of the papers on discrimination against disadvantaged groups published in top economics outlets find significant
evidence for it (Bohren, Haggag, Imas, & Pope, 2019; Lane, 2016). A caveat: though, none of this research looks at the worker-
to-boss discrimination angle.
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design. Section 4 summarizes the data. In Section 5, we present the results followed by structural
estimation in Section 6; concluding remarks are in Section 7.
2 Model and Treatments
In this section, we present the model of behavior that is used to design the experiment. The model
explains a worker’s effort choice given the monetary and non-monetary incentives and costs of working
for an employer. Our design is inspired by DellaVigna et al. (2016) modified to permit discrimination
from the workers’ side. In the setup, workers choose how much effort to provide on a real-effort task.
A risk-neutral worker, working for an employer j, j ∈ {Neutral, Black,White}, receives utility12
Uj ≡ ( F + (s+ ρj1Gift + αjv + p)ej − c(ej)). (1)
Here, ej is the number of points (on the button-pressing task) scored by the worker when working
for an employer j, F is the fixed participation fee he receives , and s captures a sense of duty, norm,
intrinsic motivation, and competitiveness of the worker towards the task and is independent of the
employer. ρj is the reciprocity parameter per unit of effort which is activated whenever employer j
awards a gift to the worker à la Gneezy and List (2006). 1Gift is an indicator function which assumes
a value 1 when a gift is rewarded by the employer, 0 otherwise. αj captures the altruistic preference
of a worker towards employer j per unit of effort à la Becker (1974), where v is the (race independent
and exogenous) value to the employer of a unit of effort by the worker. Note that our notion of altruism
captures “pure altruism” as well as “warm glow” of the workers (DellaVigna et al. (2016)): we don’t aim
to disentangle the two. p is the piece rate per unit of effort. c(ej) is the cost of effort function, assumed,
for now, to be the same for all workers. We assume the regularity conditions c′(.) > 0, c′′(.) > 0, and
lime→∞c
′(e) =∞. The upshot is that effort is costly but helps generate both a) a private benefit (via, F,
s and p) that would appeal to Homo economicus, and b) a part (via α and ρ) that would appeal to Homo
behavioralis.
Following DellaVigna and Pope (2018) and DellaVigna et al. (2016), we analyze the optimality con-











12We assume risk neutrality because the stakes are too small for the curvature of the preferences to matter. It also leaves us
with one less parameter to estimate.
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The power cost function (2) characterizes a constant elasticity of effort with respect to return to
effort given by 1/γ, while the exponential function (3) represents decreasing elasticity of effort with
respect to return to effort given by 1/log(r/k), where r is the return to the effort. Workers’ effort at
different piece rates can be used to identify and structurally estimate both parameters of the cost-of-
effort functions, namely, k and γ.
A worker solves the problem, max Uj
ej≥0
. The interior solution is characterized by:
e?j = c
′−1 (s+ ρj1Gift + αjv + p) (4)
which, for the power cost function, yields :
e?j =
(










s+ ρj1Gift + αjv + p
k
)
for the exponential form.
We start by making the simplifying assumption that workers are homogeneous given a treatment
i.e., they will make the same effort choice as any other worker assigned to the same treatment. We
later relax this assumption to account for heterogeneity in effort within a treatment. Our goal is to
identify the parameters of the model just described. To that end, we design our treatments by varying
the incentives and behavioral motivators for the workers.
2.1 Piece Rate Treatments
Here, all else same, each worker works on a task at a given piece rate of either 0, 3, 6 or 9 cents per
unit of effort (calibrated to 100 points scored on the task). The piece rates generate income in addition
to the $1 fixed participation fee, F. By M-Turk standards, this amount of variation in piece rates is
substantial enough to elicit significant changes in effort thereby allowing us to estimate the baseline
parameters (s, k, and γ) which, in turn, are used to estimate other behavioral parameters.
Formally, in the piece rate treatments, a worker observes a piece rate p and then chooses effort
ej . There is no corresponding employer j present in these treatments. This shuts down altruism and
reciprocity right away: for any worker, αj = 0 and 1Gift = 0. The equilibrium efforts e?j in these
treatments is thus given as:
e?p = c
′−1 (s+ p) for p ∈ {0, 3, 6, 9}
The solution of effort has one behavioral unknown (s), and two unknowns from the cost function (k
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and γ). To back these out, we use effort corresponding to three different piece rates which gives us
three equations to identify these parameters.
2.2 Altruism Treatments
In the altruism treatments, each worker is matched (see below for details) to an employer (truthfully)
and he/she observes the (true) value of his/her effort to the matched employer. Specifically, each
participant knows that an employer earns 1 cent for every 100 points scored by the matched worker.
So as to not contaminate social preference with individual benefit, we set the piece rate to 0 in the three
altruism treatments. In the first treatment (altruism baseline) a worker knows he/she has been matched
to an employer but does not observe the employer’s identity. In the ’altruism black’ and ’altruism white’
treatments, the worker observes the matched employer to be black and white, respectively.
Formally, in the altruism treatments, a worker observes the zero piece rate (p = 0), the value of the
unit of effort to the employer j (v = 0.01), and then chooses effort ej by maximizing (1). There is no gift
from the employer implying 1Gift = 0. The equilibrium efforts e?j in these treatments is, thus, given as:
e?j = c
′−1 (s+ αjv) for j ∈ {Neutral, Black,White} .
We are implicitly assuming that the altruism parameter can vary by the employer’s group identity.
For instance, αWhite > αBlack (αWhite < αBlack) represents stronger (weaker) altruistic feelings for
white as opposed to black employers. (As will be clear soon, all the workers in our sample are white
which means αj represents the strength of altruism a white worker feels for the jth employer.) Notice,
since the piece rate is held fixed at 0 and reciprocity is shut out, the difference in effort provision
between the ’altruism white’ and ’altruism black’ treatments is indentifiable as resulting solely from
the employer-race-dependent altruistic preferences of the workers. The three altruism treatments help
us identify αNeutral, αBlack, and αWhite, given the baseline parameters.
2.3 Reciprocity Treatments
Reciprocity treatments build on the altruism treatments and add a positive monetary gift (20 cents)
from the employer to the worker. The remaining details are exactly the same as in altruism treatments.
Thus, the equilibrium effort is given as;
e?j = c
′−1 (s+ αjv + ρj) for j ∈ {Neutral, Black,White}
As above, we are implicitly assuming that the reciprocity parameter may be different for each em-
ployer’s group identity. In other words, controlling for the differences in altruism, the difference in
effort between the treatments ’reciprocity white’ and ’reciprocity black’ is interpreted as resulting
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solely from the differential reciprocity preferences of the workers. The three reciprocity treatments
help us identify ρNeutral, ρBlack, and ρWhite given the baseline and altruism parameters.
3 Experiment Design
The main goal of this study is to investigate the possibility of discrimination by workers towards their
out-group employers in an online labor market. Our variable of choice is effort provision and the margin
of choice is intensive. Our experiment is designed to ensure that observed differences in effort provision
can only realize because of the race-dependent social preferences of workers. That is, if we detect any
discrimination, it will be entirely driven by taste parameters; after all, we rule out the possibility of
statistical discrimination by making it clear that employers will not get to make any payoff-relevant (or
otherwise) choices after workers have finished working on the task.
3.1 Task
We need a task that is costly, effort-wise, to workers but is not meaningful in any way to a particu-
lar race. The task must require no special ability either. We settled on a button-pressing task as in
DellaVigna and Pope (2018). The task involves alternating presses of “a” and “b” on a keyboard for 10
minutes. We chose it because it is simple to understand and has features that parallel clerical jobs: it
involves repetition, it gets tiring (and boring), and therefore tests the motivation of the workers to stick
to it and bring benefits to himself or his employer.
3.2 Race Revelation
We take the approach of revealing race via the revelation of skin color (Doleac & Stein, 2013). To that
end, we record videos of employers in otherwise-identical scenarios as they read off a script explaining
and demonstrating the task. The camera placement only captures the hand of the employer along with
the movement of the fingers alternating ‘a’ and ‘b’ button presses. Other identifiers, such as the face,
are not captured in the video to avoid psychological confounds often associated with faces, such as
attractiveness and trustworthiness (Eckel & Petrie, 2011). The employer’s hand is bare or covered
(with full sleeves and latex gloves) depending on the assigned treatment. For black employers, we
restrict the sample to participants with darker skin tone to avoid any ambiguity about the race of the
person. We mute the voice for the videos in the neutral treatments. We program each video to play with
subtitles to aid easier understanding of the instructions. The sample video links for each treatment are
given in Table 1.
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3.3 Experiment Flow
The experiment proceeds as follows: (1) First, we recruit employers, students from a major public uni-
versity in the U.S. Midwest and record videos of them explaining the task, 2) next, we post a HIT on
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk inviting M-Turkers to take a screener survey , (3) we invite those who meet
the recruitment criteria (undisclosed) and consent to participate to initiate the experiment, (4) upon
initiation, we assign each subject to one of the aforediscussed treatment groups. Following Czibor,
Jimenez-Gomez, and List (2019), we use the blocked randomization design to assign subjects to treat-
ments. We define blocks based on demographic information collected in the screener survey (Gender,
Age, Race, Education, Income, Political Party Affiliation, and the Most-Lived U.S. state),13 Next, (5) we
present instructions to each subject in a pre-recorded video (based on the assigned treatment). We pro-
gram our study to require each worker to watch the assigned video. Finally, (6) we elicit incentivised
beliefs from each worker about their matched employer,14’15 and 7) workers start to work on the task
for a maximum of 10-minutes.
3.3.1 Piece Rate Treatments
In the piece rate treatments, each worker sees a video demonstrating a task with a script: “On the next
page, you will play a simple button-pressing task. The object of the task is to alternately press the ‘a’
and ‘b’ buttons on your keyboard as quickly as possible for ten minutes. Every time you successfully
press the ‘a’ and then the ‘b’ button, you will receive a point. Note that points will only be rewarded
when you alternate button pushes: just pressing the ‘a’ or ‘b’ button without alternating between the
two will not result in points. Buttons must be pressed by hand only (key-bindings or automated button-
pushing programs/scripts cannot be used), or task will not be approved. Feel free to score as many
points as you can.” The final line is tailored to the assigned treatment (0, 3, 6 or 9 cents). The wording
is provided in Table 1. Even though piece rates are framed in units of 100 points, workers are paid
continuously for each point scored and are able to see the earned bonus in real time as they score
points.
3.3.2 Social Preference Treatments
In the altruism and reciprocity treatments, each video starts with the introduction by the employer:
“Hi, I am another participant in this study who is matched to you. In this study, you will work on a
13See Cavaille (2018) for instructions on implementing sequential blocked randomization for online experiments.
14The elicitation of beliefs before workers start work on the task serves two purposes: 1) it provides us with data on workers’
beliefs about the identity of their employer, and 2) it allows for the identity of the employer to become salient to the worker;
importantly, it renders prominence to the seemingly-obvious fact that the worker is indeed matched to a real person whose payoff
will be influenced by the worker’s choices. We believe prior belief elicitation serves to increase salience of employer identity
(and yes, that includes race) but does not amount to targeted priming about race. Bear in mind that workers are not just asked
to report their beliefs on race but also about other identities, such as, gender, age, income, and education of the employer.
15To discourage random guessing in the belief elicitation part, participants are informed that an incorrect guess will lead to a
deduction of 2 cents from their final earnings.
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Table 1: Summary of treatments
Category Treatment Wording Voice Skin Color Sample
Video
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Piece Rate Your score will not affect your payment in any way. Muted Concealed Link
As a bonus, you will be paid an extra 3 cents for
every 100 points that you score.
Muted Concealed Link
As a bonus, you will be paid an extra 6 cents for
every 100 points that you score.
Muted Concealed Link
As a bonus, you will be paid an extra 9 cents for
every 100 points that you score.
Muted Concealed Link
Altruism I will earn 1 cent for every 100 points that you score.
Your score will not affect your payment in any way.
Muted Concealed Link
I will earn 1 cent for every 100 points that you score.
Your score will not affect your payment in any way.
Black Black Link
I will earn 1 cent for every 100 points that you score.
Your score will not affect your payment in any way.
White White Link
Reciprocity I will earn 1 cent for every 100 points that you score.
In appreciation to you for performing this task, I
have decided to pay you extra 20 cents as a bonus.
Your score will not affect your payment in any way.
Muted Concealed Link
I will earn 1 cent for every 100 points that you score.
In appreciation to you for performing this task, I
have decided to pay you extra 20 cents as a bonus.
Your score will not affect your payment in any way.
Black Black Link
I will earn 1 cent for every 100 points that you score.
In appreciation to you for performing this task, I
have decided to pay you extra 20 cents as a bonus.
Your score will not affect your payment in any way.
White White Link
Notes: The table list all the treatments in this study. Each piece rate treatment differs just in the last line of the script, uses no
audio, and conceals the skin color of the hand. Social preference treatments (altruism and reciprocity) begin with the introduction
of the employer (in the first person), explain the task using the same script as in piece rate treatments and then differ only in
the last paragraph of the script. Both altruism and reciprocity categories have three treatments, each with black, white, and
concealed skin tone of the employer (using gloves). In the social preference treatments of concealed skin tone, the ratio of black
and white employers is 1:1.
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simple button-pressing task, and I will earn some money depending on how well you do on the task.”
Thereafter, the script follows the same instructions as in piece rate treatments with the last paragraph
being tailored to the social preference treatment in question. The wording is provided in Table 1.
There are three treatments each in the category of altruism and reciprocity. Altruism-baseline and
reciprocity-baseline conceals the skin color of the employer in the video using latex gloves. The voice
in the baseline treatments is also muted so as not to reveal any racial markers present in the voice.
We recruit an equal number of black and white employers in the neutral treatments. The videos shown
to workers in the altruism black (white), and reciprocity black (white) clearly reveal the black (white)
skins of the employers respectively.
3.4 Recruitment of Subjects
3.4.1 Recruitment of Employers
To recruit employers, we invite male student subjects over the age of 18 from a major public university
in the U.S. Midwest who racially identify as either African American or Caucasian. We restrict our sam-
ple to male and U.S.-based employer-subjects to avoid confounds arising from identity effects of gender
and nationality effects. Holding the sample size fixed and restricting it to one social identity give us
extra statistical power and thereby ability to draw more credible inferences. We restrict the sample
to employer subjects who are either black or white (we exclude Asians and Latinos, for example) be-
cause we believe our race-revelation mechanism works best in the context of these two races. When an
employer-subject arrived at the lab, they filled out a short demographic survey and was then randomly
assigned to one of six social preference treatments. Based on the assigned treatment, subjects read
from the script and demonstrate the task on a video. Each subject was paid $5 for participation and an
additional variable amount (average of $17.5) depending on their matched worker’s performance. Our
final sample include six employers in each social preference treatment (in all, 36 employers, 18 blacks
and 18 whites).
3.4.2 Recruitment of Workers
We recruit workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a popular crowd-sourcing web-service that allows
employers (called requester) to get tasks (called Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs)) executed by employ-
ees (called workers) in exchange for a wage (called reward). Mechanical Turk is a widely used platform
for research in economics and allows access to a large pool of applicants at an affordable rate.16
We post a screener survey as the HIT on M-Turk with the following description “Fill out this 2-
minute screener survey to qualify for a study that starts immediately, take up to 15 minutes, and pays
participation bonus $1 with scope to earn extra. You will be required to watch and listen to a video. Do
16See Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis (2010) and Paolacci and Chandler (2014) for a discussion on demographic characteristics
and representation of subjects from M-Turk.
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NOT take this study on mobile.”. The responses to the screener survey allows us to pick participants
that satisfy the criteria listed above. Based on power considerations and a pilot we conducted, we found
it difficult to recruit sufficient number of black workers from M-Turk . Perforce, we restrict attention
to white workers and study their effort choices for black versus white employers. We paid 15-cents
to each potential subject for filling out the screener survey. On average, the workers in our sample
earned $1.72 (including $0.15 for the screener survey, $1.0 for participation, and upto $0.1 for belief
elicitation questions).
3.5 Pre-registration
We pre-registered the design on AEA RCT registry as AEARCTR-0003885. Since our task is the same as
used in DellaVigna and Pope (2018), we can use results from their study to determine the sample size
needed to achieve sufficient power for our study. DellaVigna and Pope (2018) find that the points scored
across all treatments have a standard deviation of around 660 . Assuming this standard deviation for
each treatment and assuming a minimum detectable effect of 0.2 standard deviations between two
treatments, we needed around 400 subjects in each treatment to have a power of 80 percent. This
implies that we needed 400 x 10 = 4,000 observations in total for all ten treatments. We pre-registered
the rule for sample size collection: we aimed to recruit 6,000 worker-subjects from M-Turk within the
first three weeks of posting the experiment. Our data collection went slower than anticipated, and we
ended up recruiting subjects from August 5th, 2019 to October 24th, 2019. In our registration, we had
also planned to recruit self-identified black workers, which as explained above, did not work out.
4 Data
4.1 Employers
The demographic characteristics of the employer subjects in each treatment are presented in Table B1.
4.1.1 Pre-Testing of Videos
To verify whether the videos accurately reveal race , we test them using an independent sample of
U.S.-based, white subjects from Academic Prolific, a data collection platform. We used them instead of
M-Turk to ensure that our M-Turk recruits could not have watched these videos before they participate
in our experiment. Each subject was asked to identify the race of the person in a randomly-assigned
video. See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of average perception of race across treatments.
Overall, race is correctly perceived more than 80 percent of the time for all the race-salient treat-
ments: – our race revelation mechanism works. For the race-neutral treatments, only less than 30
percent of the participants could guess the rac, probably the result of random guessing. The pairwise
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Figure 1: Race Perception
Notes: This figure shows the proportion of individuals who were able to correctly guess the race of the
employer after watching a video.
comparisons of race perception among these treatments is presented in Table B2. The results suggest
that the race-neutral treatments (altruism and reciprocity) are statistically indistinguishable from each
other and significantly different from race-salient treatments. The perception of race in the treatments
‘Altruism Black’ and ‘Altruism White’ is statistically indistinguishable; however ’Reciprocity Black’ is
not perceived as accurately as ’Reciprocity White’.
Participants also evaluated the videos in race-salient treatments for perception of skin color; the
results are presented in Figure 2. Overall, blacks’ skin is correctly perceived to be of darker tone and
whites’ of lighter tone. The pairwise comparisons of skin color perception among these treatments is
presented in Table B2. The results suggest black treatments are statistically indistinguishable from
each other and are significantly different from white treatments.
Finally, to check whether subjects in the videos were not perceived differently on soft personality
traits such as friendliness, professionalism, clarity etc., we get these videos rated on those traits. The
results for positive and negative traits are presented in Figure A1 and A2 of the Appendix A respectively.
Pairwise comparisons of means across all the social-preference treatments suggest only the reciprocity-
black treatment is perceived to be significantly higher on positive traits while all other treatments are
statistically indistinguishable from each other on both positive and negative traits (see Table B3 of the
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Figure 2: Skin Color Perception




As per the pre-registration, we apply the following restrictions to the collected data: (1) we drop 17
participants who scored above 4,000 points as this is physically impossible in the 10- minute time-
frame – likely, these users used some automated programs to score points;17, 2) we drop 64 workers
who scored zero points as this may reflect some malfunction or technical problem in the recording of
points;18 (3) we drop 4 observations of workers who participate more than once;19 (4) we dropped two
observations from workers who somehow managed to take this study from outside the United States.20
The final sample consists of 5,945 workers and the summary statistics are presented in Table 2.
Our sample over represents women, young, educated, middle-income, and Democrats as compared to
the U.S. labor force. This is typical of the population on online platforms. We present results of pro-
ductivity by demographics in Table B10. Overall in our sample, men and younger workers are more
productive than women and older workers respectively. We present test-of-balance of demographic
variables across ten treatments in Table B4 of the the Appendix B. The treatments are balanced on
all the observed variables, no surprise since we use blocked randomization to assign subjects to treat-
ments. Since worker characteristics are balanced across treatments, there is no reason to believe that
more/less productive workers are assigned to any specific treatment.
5 Results
We present average effort by workers (recall, all our workers are white) against each treatment in
column 1 of Table 3 and in Figure 3. Overall, it is evident that incentives have a strong effect on effort,
raising performance from 1627 points (piece rate of 0) to 2060 points (3-cent piece rate) and 2127
points (9-cent piece rate).21 The standard error for the mean effort per treatment is around 30 points
or less, implying that differences across treatments larger than 85 points are statistically significant.
How do we detect altruism? We compute the average effort of workers in the altruism-neutral
treatment; recall, these are workers who know they are matched to an employer but don’t know his
race. We compare that to the average effort of workers who are not matched to any employer and
are offered a 0-cent piece rate. We find statistically significant evidence for altruism: workers put
more effort in the altruism-neutral treatment as compared to the piece rate 0-cent treatment. The one
17We instructed each worker up-front to not use any automated scripts/programs .
18These workers are spread across all treatments, and there is no systematic difference in workers scoring zero points for any
particular treatment or employer.
19A worker can participate in our study only once; these exceptions must be an error on the part of M-Turk.
20The study was restricted to U.S.-based workers. Presumably, these participants used a proxy server or VPN to mask their
origin but we could spot them from the GPS coordinates recorded by Qualtrics.
21Workers’ positive effort in the 0-cent treatment is explained by the parameter s of the model in Section 2. Part of the positive
effort could also be workers’ unsubstantiated fear of being rejected for not scoring enough points.
17
Table 2: Summary Statistics, Worker Sample
(1) (2)












65 and over 0.03 0.06
Education
Less than high school 0.01 0.14
High school or equivalent 0.13 0.39
Some college 0.28 0.35
College graduate 0.41 0.30
Graduate or professional degree 0.18 0.18
Income
Less than $20,000 0.17 0.20
$20,000 - $44,999 0.31 0.26
$45,000 - $99,999 0.38 0.33











Notes: The table presents demographic information of worker subjects. Column (1) presents propor-
tion of the worker subjects by their gender, race, age, education, income, party, and the most lived state
in the United States. Column (2) presents these demographics for US labor force based on 2018 num-
bers from Bureau of Labor Statistics/Current Population Survey. Estimates of population by political
affiliation and by blue, red, and swing state are based on Gallup polling survey 2019.
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Table 3: Effort by Treatment
(1) (2)
All Workers Correctly Perceived Race
N Mean (s.e) N Mean (s.e)
Piece Rate - 0 cents 599 1627.07 599 1627.07
(28.56) (28.56)
Piece Rate - 3 cents 595 2059.83 595 2059.83
(24.19) (24.19)
Piece Rate - 6 cents 592 2046.68 592 2046.68
(23.62) (23.62)
Piece Rate - 9 cents 588 2127.37 588 2127.37
(23.01) (23.01)
Altruism - Neutral 591 1746.06 261 1724.87
(29.15) (43.70)
Altruism - Black 601 1798.37 494 1807.68
(27.55) (29.58)
Altruism - White 592 1708.09 557 1715.24
(28.90) (29.52)
Reciprocity - Neutral 608 1771.15 265 1766.99
(27.95) (41.63)
Reciprocity - Black 590 1803.61 470 1818.78
(26.95) (29.73)
Reciprocity - White 589 1798.23 561 1803.75
(29.58) (30.33)
Total 5945 1848.08 4982 1865.98
(8.80) (9.49)
Notes: The table presents the effort choices in each treatment. Column 1 reports the effort choices by
all the workers, column 2 reports the effort choices by workers who were able to correctly perceive the
race of the employer as neutral, black or white in social preference treatments.
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Figure 3: Effort by Treatment - All Workers
Notes: This figure presents the average score and confidence interval for each of ten treatments for all
workers. Each treatment has about 590 participants.
20
cent return to the employer induces an effort of 1746 points as compared to 1627 points in the 0-cent
treatment.
Next, we wish to compare the strength of the altruism preference across black and white employers.
To that end, we compute the average effort of workers in the altruism-black treatment to those in the
altruism-white treatment. Strikingly, workers are significantly more altruistic towards black employers
than white employers. The average effort for black employers is 1798 points, which is significantly
higher (p = 0.024) than the same for white employers (1708 points). However, note that in the altruism
treatments, average effort forany race employer is not significantly different from the same for a race-
neutral employer .
In the reciprocity treatments, the worker receives an unanticipated gift of 20-cents (in addition to
all other earnings) from the employer, unconditional on performance. This gift does not induce a signif-
icant increase in effort as compared to the altruism treatment (1771 points in the reciprocity-neutral
treatment as compared to 1746 points in the altruism-neutral treatment). The reciprocal response to
the employer’s racial identity is also insignificant, implying that, on average, workers do not recipro-
cate towards any employer race. This result is consistent with the literature which finds weak evidence
for positive reciprocity (such as Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe (2006)).
In column 2 of Table 3, we restrict the analysis to only workers who could correctly guess the race
of the employer in the social preference treatments. This does not substantially affect the direction or
magnitude of the results.
Although our treatments are balanced on observed worker and employer characteristics, for robust-
ness sake we present the regression results from regressing “Points” scored on the employer racial
identity and controlling for these variables in the Table 4. We observe that workers’ pro-altruistic
response for black employers stays significant even after controlling for the demographic variables.
Controlling for employer fixed effects makes the altruism effect larger in magnitude, but is no longer
statistically significant presumably because of lower power to detect the effect size (via loss in degrees
of freedom).22 The reciprocity response stays statistically indifferent from zero for all the specifications.
We also test (do not report) whether the altruistic response toward black employers is driven by the
workers’ beliefs about the income of their employers. For example, it is conceivable white workers are
inequity averse and believe they ought to work harder to generate more income for blacks who they
perceive to have low income. If that is the case, then any observed positive altruism towards black
employers would , in fact, capture positive altruism towards the low-income group. However, since
we do not observe differential beliefs about the income of black and white employers, we are certain
the higher altruistic response towards blacks is most likely not driven by differential beliefs about the
income of the employers.23
22The employer fixed effect controls for the personality traits of the employer which may have had an effect on a worker’s effort
choice.
23It is important to note that we allow for only two perceptions about income (greater than $45k and less than $45k per year).
Also, any variation in beliefs about income may be pure noise, given that nothing other than skin color is observable .
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Table 4: Social Preference Treatments - Robustness
Altruism Reciprocity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White or Caucasian -90.28∗ -84.51∗ -124.1 -5.379 -1.803 -70.48
(39.92) (40.77) (99.48) (40.01) (40.89) (102.3)
Constant 1798.4∗∗∗ 1822.5∗∗∗ 1709.2∗∗∗ 1803.6∗∗∗ 1772.0∗∗∗ 1753.7∗∗∗
(28.12) (294.0) (302.1) (28.28) (289.2) (300.0)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Employer Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1193 1138 1138 1179 1126 1126
Notes: The table presents the estimates from an OLS regression of Points in the race salient social pref-
erence treatments on the employer’s race. The omitted category is the Black employer. Demographic
controls include age, gender, education, income, political affiliation and the voting pattern of the most
lived state (red, blue, or swing) of the worker. There are total of 12 employer fixed effects for each of
altruism and reciprocity treatments. Standard errors in parentheses.* for p < 0.05, ** for p < 0.01, and
*** for p< 0.001
5.1 Distribution of Effort
Beyond average effort, we present the distribution of effort from all the treatments in Figure A3 of the
Appendix A and by each treatment in Figure A4 of the Appendix A. Overall, very few workers score
below 500 points and even fewer score above 3000 points.
Figure 4a presents the cumulative distribution function for the piece rate treatments. Incentives
induce a clear rightward shift in effort relative to the 0-cent treatment. However, there is not much
change in effort between the 3-cent and the 6-cent treatments. Figure 4b shows strong evidence for
altruistic preferences as observed by the clear rightward shift of the effort distribution in the altruism
treatment as compared to the 0-cent treatment. The effort distribution in the reciprocity treatment is in-
distinguishable from the altruism treatment, implying a lack of reciprocal preferences. Figure 4c shows
that altruism is stronger towards blacks as compared to whites while the cumulative density function is
indistinguishable for reciprocity-black and reciprocity-white treatments. Quantile regression estimates
for effort (not tabulated) show that black employers get higher effort than white employers at each
quantile for the altruism treatments. This shows that the altruistic response for the black employers
is coming from the entire effort distribution and not just from one particular part. On the other hand,
there is no difference between black and white employers for the reciprocity treatments at any quantile.
5.2 Evolution of Effort
We present the evolution of effort over the 10-minute period in Figure 5. Figure 5b shows that, in the
social preference treatments, effort declines over time presumably due to boredom and tiredness. And





Figure 4: Cumulative distribution function
Notes: The figure presents the cumulative distribution function of points for the workers in each of
the treatments featured. The sample size in each treatment is approximately 590 subjects. Figure a
features the four piece rate treatments (no piece rate, 3-cent per 100 points, 6 cents per 100 points,
and 9 cents per 100 points). Figure b presents the results for the race-neutral treatments. Figure c
presents the results for the race-salient treatments.
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entire time interval (Figure 5a), with workers in the 9-cent treatment pushing extra hard near the end.
5.3 Heterogeneity
5.3.1 Heterogeneity by Demographics
To examine the heterogeneity in our average treatment effects based on demographic characteristics of
the sample, we present the conditional average treatment effects in Table B5 and B6 of the Appendix B
for altruism treatments and in Table B7 and B8 of the Appendix B for reciprocity treatments. Overall, we
do not find evidence of heterogeneity on the basis of gender, age, education, income, and state voting
pattern for both altruism and reciprocity treatments. However, we do find evidence for heterogeneity
in altruism on the basis of party affiliation:Republicans and Independents exert significantly more effort
than Democrats for black employers relative to white employers, indicating the presence of pro-black,
altruistic preferences among Republicans and Independents as compared to Democrats.
5.3.2 Heterogeneity by the share of black population in the neighborhood
Following Andreoni, Payne, Smith, and Karp (2016), we explore the effects of local racial composition on
social preferences of the workers in our sample. We condition on the zip code level racial composition
of the worker and examine the difference in effort provided to black versus white employers. Figure 6
presents the conditional average treatment effects for each decile of the share of black population for
workers who correctly perceived the employer race. Overall, the difference in effort provided to the
black versus white employers is statically zero at each level of black share of population.
5.3.3 Heterogeneity by Geographical Area
It is a well established fact that racial disparities are not equally distributed across the U.S. We present
the summary of workers performance by their geographical area in Table 5. Interestingly, there is a
weak evidence in favor of workers from South being relatively more pro-social to black employers. This
is surprising given that the average implicit bias against blacks (see next subsection) in the South is
higher than in the other regions of the U.S.
5.3.4 Heterogeneity by Implicit Biases
We examine the heterogeneity in treatment effects based on the implicit biases of workers as measured
by the implicit association test (IAT). IATs are widely used in social psychology to measure implicit and
unconscious biases towards a particular group. The test involves categorizing two sets of words to
the left or right hand side of the computer screen. Implicit bias is measured by a time difference in
associating good or bad words to the relevant group identities. The idea is that making a response is




Figure 5: Evolution of effort over time
Notes: This figure presents the effort over time for selected treatments. The y axis indicates the
average number of points scored in that treatment per minute.
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Figure 6: Treatment effects by local racial composition
Notes: The figure presents the conditional average treatment effects (conditioned on the share of
blacks in a zip code). The x-axis represents deciles of the share of black population in a zip code.
Measure of conditional treatment effect is obtained by pooling data from race salient social preference
treatments of workers who could correctly perceive the employer race and running a regression of
Points on Employer Race for each decile of the black share. The cutoff values of the deciles are 0,
0.009, 0.018, 0.03, 0.045, 0.065, 0.094, 0.137, 0.207, and 0.351.
Table 5: Heterogeneity by Geographical Area
Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
North East Mid West South West
White or Caucasian -34.55 -36.83 -72.28 -31.67
(72.20) (57.17) (48.99) (73.74)
Constant 3083.1 1634.6 1366.0 1630.7
(737.4) (390.5) (333.7) (438.9)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 377 529 771 405
Notes: The table presents the conditional average treatment effect by the geographical location of
the worker. Measure of conditional treatment effect is obtained by pooling data from race salient
social preference treatments of workers who could correctly perceive the employer race and running a
regression of Points on Employer Race for each geographical region. Standard errors in parenthesis.
26
IAT, we would say that one has an implicit preference for white people relative to black people if they
are faster to categorize words when white face and good words (friend, glorious, enjoy, joyous, terrific,
beautiful, magnificent, and fabulous) share a response key and black faces and bad words (detest,
poison, nasty, disgust, pain, despise, sadness, evil) share a response key, relative to the reverse.
For this study, we did not conduct IAT test for individual workers. Instead we proxy the IAT score
of individual worker by using the geo-coded race IAT data by Project Implicit, which provides historical
record of tests taken on the project’s website. These tests can be taken by anyone from anywhere in the
world. For our purpose, we restrict to white individuals from the United States and use the data from
more than two million test takers between 2006 to 2018. We map the county level (lowest available
resolution) IAT score to workers in our sample based on the worker’s geographic location. Our worker
sample comes from 190 counties spanning all 50 states in the U.S.
Typical thresholds found in the literature (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, &
Blair, 2014; Rooth, 2010) are as follows: IAT scores below -0.15 indicate some preference for minori-
ties; scores between -0.15 and 0.15 indicate little to no bias; scores between 0.15 and 0.35 indicate a
slight bias against minorities; and scores above 0.35 show moderate to severe bias against minorities.
The average score (standard deviation) of white test takers in our sample is 0.38 (0.42) implying, on
average, white people have moderate to severe implicit bias against blacks. Like black share, we ex-
plore the effects of local IAT score on the social preferences of workers in our sample. We condition on
the county level IAT score of the worker and examine the difference in effort provided for black versus
white employers. Figure 7 presents the conditional average treatment effects for each decile of the
IAT score for workers who could correctly perceive the employer race. Overall, there is some indica-
tion that workers with relatively low implicit bias exhibit higher social preference towards the black
employers as compared to white employers. However, at relatively higher level of implicit biases, the
difference in effort is statistically zero. Restricting to two quantiles of IAT score clearly shows (Table 6)
that black employers get significantly higher effort than white employers in the lower quantile (lower
implicit bias), while there is no difference in effort provision for black and white employers in the upper
quantile (higher implicit bias).
6 Estimates of Behavioral Parameters
We designed our experiment to go with the structural model outlined in Section 2. The advantage of
designing field experiments on the basis of a model of behavior is that it allows researchers to estimate
the nuisance parameters in the environment that are relevant to decision making (DellaVigna, 2018).
Because of the simplicity of our task, there are only three nuisance parameters we need to estimate.
We use data from the piece rate treatments to identify these parameters. Subsequently, we estimate
the deeper behavioral parameters of interest using data from the social preference treatments. We
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Figure 7: CATE by IAT deciles
Notes: The figure presents the conditional average treatment effects (conditioned on the IAT score
of the worker’s county). The x-axis represents deciles of the IAT score at county level. Measure of
treatment effect is obtained by pooling data from race salient social preference treatments of workers
who could perceive the employer race correctly and running a regression of Points on Employer Race
for each decile of the IAT score. The cutoff values of the deciles are 0.295, 0.349, 0.376, 0.381, 0.386,
0.396, 0.404, 0.413, 0.415, and 0.444.
Table 6: CATE by IAT Quantiles - Bottom and Top
Implicit Bias of Worker’s County
(1) (2)
Lower Implicit Bias Higher Implicit Bias




Demographic Controls Yes Yes
Observations 1057 1010
Notes: The table presents the conditional average treatment effect by the bottom and top quantile of the
IAT score of the worker’s county. Measure of conditional treatment effect is obtained by pooling data
from race salient social preference treatments of workers who could correctly perceive the employer
race and running a regression of Points on Employer Race for bottom (column 1) and top (column 2)
quantile of IAT score. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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closely follow the estimation procedure in DellaVigna and Pope (2018) .
6.1 Minimum-Distance Estimation
We first use minimum-distance estimation method to estimate these parameters. In minimum distance
estimation, one identifies the set of moments in the data (average effort) and then finds the set of model
parameters that minimizes the distance between the empirical moments and the theory-predicted mo-
ments. To estimate nuisance parameters, we use the average effort corresponding to the three piece
rates (0 cents, 3 cents and 9 cents), to estimate γ, s, and k. Specifically, in the case of the power cost
function, to estimate nuisance parameters, we use first moments from the piece rate treatments and




[log(s+ p)− log(k)] for p ∈ {0, 0.03, 0.09}
where ēp is the average effort in the piece rate p treatment. These parameters estimates are used
to draw the marginal cost and marginal benefit curve in Figure 8.
Once these parameters are estimated, we use average effort corresponding to altruism neutral,
altruism black and altruism white treatment to estimate behavioral parameters αNeutral, αBlack, and
αWhite respectively. Specifically, for the power cost function, we solve the following equations for αj




[log(s+ αjv)− log(k)] for j ∈ {Neutral, Black,White}
where ēαj is the average effort in the altruism j treatment.
Similarly, to calculate reciprocity parameters for neutral (ρNeutral), black (ρBlack) and white (ρWhite)
employers, we use average effort from reciprocity neutral, reciprocity black, and reciprocity white





[log(s+ ρj + αjv)− log(k)] for j ∈ {Neutral, Black,White}
where ēρj is the average effort in the reciprocity j treatment.
Estimates using the exponential cost function are similarly calculated. Table 7 presents the parame-
ter estimates for power cost function (column 1) and exponential cost function (column 3). The standard
errors for these parameter estimates are estimated using a bootstrap procedure with a thousand draws.
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Figure 8: Illustration of the Model: Marginal Benefits and Cost Curves
Notes: The figure presents the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves using minimum-distance
estimates for the power cost function.
6.2 Non-Linear Least Squares Estimation
The minimum distance estimator solely relies on the moment, and hence, does not use all the variation
in the data. There are methods such as maximum likelihood and non-linear least squares that can be
used to estimate these parameters using all the variation present in the data. We use non-linear least
square method to estimate these parameters allowing for the heterogeneous cost of effort. Allowing
for a heterogeneous marginal cost of effort in 1, we assume for a worker i, for a power cost case,
c(eij) =
ke1+γij
1+γ exp(−γεij) with εij ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε ). The first order condition 4 can then be written as;
s+ 1Giftρj + αjv + p− keγijexp(−γεij) = 0
Taking the last term to the right and taking logs, we obtain
log(s+ 1Giftρj + αjv + p) + εij = log(k) + γlog(eij)− γεij




[log(s+ 1Giftρj + αjv + p)− log(k)] + εij . (5)




[log(s+ 1Giftρj + αjv + p)− log(k)] + εij . (6)
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Figure 9: Simulated Effort by Employer Race at Different Piece Rates
Notes: The figure presents the simulated effort using the parameter estimates from table 7 for power
cost, minimum distance specification. Neutral/Black/White employer uses the respected social prefer-
ence parameter estimates to calculate the predicted effort at each piece rate. No Social Preference
assumes that altruism and reciprocity estimates are zero.
Equations 5 and 6 can be estimated using non-linear least squares (NLS). Table 7 presents the NLS
parameter estimates for power cost function (column 2) and exponential cost function (column 4). The
NLS parameter estimates are nearly identical to those computed with minimum-distance estimation for
the exponential cost case. The model predictions are also very similar .
The NLS estimates for the power cost function yield a lower curvature than the minimum-distance
estimates (γ̂NLS = 20.29 versus γ̂MD = 34.05). The NLS model matches expected log effort, while
the minimum-distance matches the log of expected effort. Both NLS and minimum-distance fit the
in-sample moments and make similar predictions for the 6-cent piece rate treatment.
The parameter estimate for ’altruism black’ is significantly higher than ’altruism white’ in all the
specifications, indicating that white workers have significantly higher altruistic preferences for black
employers as compared to white employers. The reciprocity estimates indicate a null effect from the gift
for any employer in all the specifications. Even though the parameter values are close to zero, but they
translate to meaningful differences in effort provided to black and white employers at the zero piece
rate. Figure 9 presents the simulated effort for neutral, black and white employer using parameter
estimates along with zero social-preference case. Black employers receive around five percent higher
effort than white employers at the zero piece rate. The difference between black and white employers
becomes negligible at higher piece rates because workers respond much more to monetary incentives
as compared to social preferences.
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates
Power cost of effort Exponential cost of effort
Minimum distance NLS on Individual Minimum distance NLS on individual
estimator on average effort effort estimator on average effort effort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Parameters
Curvature γ of cost of effort function 34.05 20.30 0.0163 0.0163
(15.9) (8.85) (.0207) (.00807)
Intrinsic motivation s (cents per point) 0.00000977 0.00000802 0.0000264 0.0000264
(.000246) (.000032) (.000389) (.000101)
Level k of cost of effort function 4.50e-115 2.98e-70 8.58e-17 8.58e-17
(2.7e-46) (2.5e-68) (7.1e-09) (1.5e-15)
Altruism Parameters
Altruism αNeutral towards neutral employer 0.00983 0.000426 0.0156 0.0156
(.00779) (.0017) (.0103) (.0427)
Altruism αBlack towards black employer 0.0285 0.000776 0.0402 0.0402
(.0186) (.00274) (.0226) (.0953)
Altruism αWhite towards white employer 0.00413 0.000270 0.00722 0.00722
(.00367) (.00129) (.00552) (.0215)
Reciprocity Parameters
Reciprocity ρNeutral towards neutral employer 0.0000676 0.0000272 0.0000921 0.00124
(.000136) (.000103) (.000173) (.00318)
Reciprocity ρBlack towards black employer 0.0000307 0.0000395 0.0000381 0.00220
(.000265) (.00014) (.000308) (.00513)
Reciprocity ρWhite towards white employer 0.000243 0.0000255 0.000328 0.00200
(.00021) (.0001) (.000257) (.00477)
Implied effort at 6-cents expected log effort
(observed effort 2047, log 7.624) 2102 7.746 2102 2102.4
Notes: This table reports the structural estimates of the model in section 2. Column (1) and (3) use a minimum-distance estimator employing three
moments (average effort in three piece rate treatments) and three parameters (γ , s and k), and is thus exactly identified. Column (2) and (4) use a
non-linear least squares employing individual effort in all the treatments and thus estimating all the parameters simultaneously. We use power cost
(column 1 and 2) and exponential cost (column 3 and 4) function to estimate the model. Implied effort is calculated using estimated parameters
for each model. For the altruism parameters, the baseline parameters are taken as given and the average effort for neutral, black, and white
employers is used to estimate αNeutral, αBlack, and αWhite from the altruism treatments. Similarly for the reciprocity parameters, the baseline
and altruism parameters are taken as given and the average effort corresponding to reciprocity neutral, reciprocity black, and reciprocity white is
used to estimate ρNeutral, ρBlack, and ρWhite. Standard errors for minimum-distance estimator are calculated by taking a bootstrap sample of
1000 draws and recalculating these parameters for each draw.
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7 Conclusion
Economic historians record a time in US labor history when white workers openly militated against
receiving orders from (or working under) black supervisors. Things have changed. “[W]hile overt
racism was implicated in the past, it is behavioral differences that lie at the root of racial inequality in
contemporary America” (Loury, 1998). What are these behavioral differences? Now that overt racism
is either deemed illegal or too difficult to practice openly, have white workers stopped discriminating
against black employers? This paper uses insights from behavioral and experimental economics to shed
light on this enduring issue in American labor markets. The narrower question we ask is, do workers
with a considerable degree of discretion over work effort display differential, race-dependent social
preferences toward their out-race employers?
The experimental setting is an online labor market - Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (M-Turk). In this
gig economy, workers and employers are at arms length and the worker is involved in a real-effort
task for a pre-assigned, non-fictitious, black or white employer. The possibility of race-dependent social
preferences is activated by unobtrusively revealing the employer’s race to the matched worker. We
detect statistically significant evidence for altruism: workers put more effort when they know their
work benefits the employer (altruism neutral treatment) as compared to a treatment where neither the
worker nor the employer benefits from worker effort. Most importantly, white workers are significantly
more altruistic towards black employers than white employers. Importantly, this result is not driven
by beliefs white workers have for the income status of their black employers. Not only is this finding
statistically significant at the 2% level, the difference in effort provision is economically powerful as
well. There is suggestive evidence that the higher effort towards black employers is driven by workers
with relatively low implicit bias against blacks.
Our results suggest that preference-based discrimination against minorities may dampen as tradi-
tional labor markets get replaced with gig economy ones. Indeed, our results are roughly in line with a
new body of research that finds a general erosion of racially-motivated discrimination in hiring in U.S.
labor markets. Lahey and Oxley (2018) finds while “younger white applicants are preferred to younger
black applicants, this preference diminishes with age as white applicants become less attractive and
black applicants become more attractive. Indeed, we find no preference for white compared to black
applicants in their 50s, and black applicants are even preferred in some specifications.”
That is not to say that racial discrimination is disappearing or will soon, nor do we suggest that
pro-social behavior of whites towards blacks is omnipresent. Indeed, the pro-sociality may vanish in
settings where employer-worker engagement is longer and involves physical interaction. Likewise, we
recognize that unlike the current focus on the intensive margin of worker effort, understanding social
preferences on the extensive margin may be equally important; after all, it is possible workers from
the dominant group may systematically select out of (not even apply for) jobs posted by disadvantaged-
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group employers, thereby limiting the labor resources at the disposal of said employers. In short,
if workers are given agency in who they work for, they may well avoid out-race employers. We aim
to study the extensive margin angle to worker-to-employer discrimination in future research. Our
work also does not suggest that asking whether workers differentially treat their out-race bosses in
traditional labor markets is not interesting. Far from it. The questions we ask, could in principle, be
asked in the sort of field setting studied in Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani (2017) where the researchers
set up their own factory workshops in Odisha, India to employ 378 workers full-time for one month in
seasonal manufacturing jobs. We leave this to future research.
We recognize that we do not offer a clear answer to the question, what explains the pro-social
behavior of white workers towards black employers? That question deserves full attention and it will
in our future work. We present some evidence to knock down some explanations such as “it is driven
entirely by the beliefs whites have about black incomes and the fact that whites are inequity averse”.
Another explanation that is sometimes offered – social desirability bias: people want to appear as nice
(non-racist) to the experimenter which is why they put more effort for black employers. For one, the
identity of the experimenters was never made salient to the subjects. Second, in order for a white
subject to put more effort for black relative to white employers because of his social desirability bias,
he must know what the experimenter deems as appropriate levels of effort toward black and white
employers. Also bear in mind that the game ends after the worker has finished the task. Subsequent to
that, there is no possibility of communication (and everyone knows this ex ante) between the employer
and the worker implying the worker could not be motivated by a desire to signal anything to the
employer. In particular, given the one-shot nature of the encounter, even if the worker has an innate
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A Miscellaneous Figures
Figure A1: Perception of Positive Personality Traits
Notes: This figure presents the box-plot of average of positive traits as rated by the evaluators. After
the evaluators watched the video they were asked “Please rate the following characteristics about
the the person in the above video”. The positive traits were friendliness, confidence, encouragement,
trustfulness, clarity, and motivation .
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Figure A2: Perception of Negative Personality Traits
Notes: This figure presents the box-plot of average rating of negative traits by the evaluators. After
the evaluators watched the video they were asked “Please rate the following characteristics about
the person in the above video”. The negative traits were arrogance, laziness, bossinesss, rudeness,
hostility, and undermining.
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Figure A3: Distribution of effort
Notes: This figure plots a histogram of the observed points over all 10 treatments.
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Figure A4: Distribution of effort by Treatment
Notes: This figure plots a histogram of the observed points by each of the 10 treatments.
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B Miscellaneous Tables
Table B1: Demographic Information of Employer Subjects
(1) (2) (3)
All Subjects Blacks Whites
Gender
Male 1.00 1.00 1.00
Female 0.00 0.00 0.00
Race
Black or African American 0.50 1.00 0.00
White or Caucasian 0.50 0.00 1.00
Age
18-24 0.78 0.61 0.94
25-34 0.14 0.22 0.06
35-44 0.06 0.11 0.00
45-54 0.03 0.06 0.00
Education
High school or equivalent 0.06 0.00 0.11
Some college 0.64 0.50 0.78
College graduate 0.19 0.28 0.11
Master’s degree 0.08 0.17 0.00
Doctoral degree 0.03 0.06 0.00
Most lived state
Blue 0.28 0.22 0.33
Red 0.03 0.06 0.00
Swing 0.69 0.72 0.67
Observations 36 18 18
Notes: The table presents demographic information of employer subjects. Column (1) presents propor-
tion of all the employer subjects by their gender, race, age and education. Column (2) and column (3)
presents these information for only black and white employers respectively.
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Table B2: Test of Difference of Perception of Race and Skin Color




Altruism 0.29 (0.03) 1
Altruism Black 0.91 (0.03) 23
Altruism White 0.98 (0.03) 3
Reciprocity 0.26 (0.03) 1
Reciprocity Black 0.83 (0.03) 2
Reciprocity White 0.96 (0.03) 3
Degrees of Freedom 1016




Altruism Black 4.81 (0.05) 1
Altruism White 2.05 (0.05) 2
Reciprocity Black 4.57 (0.05) 1
Reciprocity White 2.11 (0.05) 2
Degrees of Freedom 667
Notes: Panel A presents the proportion of subjects who could correctly guess the race of the employer in
the video. Panel B presents the average skin color as perceived by the subjects in each treatment. The
skin color can vary from 1 to 6 where 1 represents the ‘light, pale white’ while 6 represents the ‘very
dark brown to black’ skin tone. Proportions sharing a digit in the ‘Group’ column are not significantly
different at the 5% level. The comparisonwise error rate is adjusted using the Bonferroni method.
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Table B3: Test of Difference of Personality Traits
(1) (2)
Positive Traits Negative Traits
Mean SE Group Mean SE Group
Altruism 3.27 (0.07) 12 1.33 (0.04) 12
Altruism Black 3.33 (0.07) 12 1.19 (0.04) 1
Altruism White 3.15 (0.07) 1 1.30 (0.04) 12
Reciprocity 3.26 (0.07) 12 1.38 (0.04) 2
Reciprocity Black 3.51 (0.07) 2 1.24 (0.04) 12
Reciprocity White 3.28 (0.07) 12 1.28 (0.04) 12
Degrees of Freedom 852 929
Notes: The table presents the average of perceived positive and negative traits across the social pref-
erence treatments. The perception of the trait can vary from 1-Not at all to 5-Extremely. Positive
Trait is constructed by taking an average of the ratings on; friendliness, confidence, encouragement,
trustfulness, clarity, and motivation . Negative Trait is constructed by taking an average of the ratings
on; arrogance, laziness, bossinesss, rudeness, hostility, and undermining. Means sharing a digit in the
group label are not significantly different at the 5% level. The comparisonwise error rate is adjusted
using the Bonferroni method.
Table B9: Social Preference Treatments - Robustness, Employer Race Correctly Perceived
Altruism Reciprocity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White or Caucasian -92.45∗ -92.45∗ -25.12 -15.02 -5.901 -33.61
(41.94) (42.97) (106.6) (42.88) (43.80) (108.6)
Constant 1807.7∗∗∗ 1703.7∗∗∗ 1487.5∗∗∗ 1818.8∗∗∗ 1788.0∗∗∗ 1739.3∗∗∗
(30.53) (316.5) (325.1) (31.63) (290.1) (303.7)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Employer Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1051 1000 1000 1031 986 986
Notes: The table presents the estimates from an OLS regression of Points in the race salient social
preference treatments on the employer’s race for workers who could correctly perceive the race of
the employer. The omitted category is the Black employer. Demographic controls include age, gender,
education, income, political affiliation and the voting pattern of the most lived state (red, blue, or
swing) of the worker. There are total of 12 employer fixed effects for each of altruism and reciprocity
treatments. Standard errors in parentheses.
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65 and over 10.19 (0.335)
Education
High school or equivalent 3.744 (0.927)
Some college 2.884 (0.969)
College graduate 3.511 (0.941)
Graduate or professional degree 2.753 (0.973)
Income
$20,000 - $44,999 6.928 (0.645)
$45,000 - $99,999 10.38 (0.321)
$100,000 - $149,999 10.13 (0.340)
$150,000+ 11.01 (0.275)







Notes: The table presents the χ2 and corresponding p-values of the likelihood ratio (LR) test of the
equality of each coefficient from multinomial-logit regression of Treatment status on the demographic
variables.
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Table B5: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects - Altruism Treatments
(1) (2) (3)
Gender Age Education




White or Caucasian × Male -74.43
(80.90)
Age 25 - 34 35.29
(90.83)
Age 35 - 44 63.93
(95.68)
Age 45 - 54 -23.21
(111.1)
Age 55 - 64 -243.6
(129.3)
Age 65 or older -46.72
(194.5)
White or Caucasian × Age 25 - 34 -125.9
(133.2)
White or Caucasian × Age 35 - 44 -152.5
(140.8)
White or Caucasian × Age 45 - 54 -96.19
(158.2)
White or Caucasian × Age 55 - 64 46.03
(184.5)






Graduate or professional degree -160.0
(100.2)
White or Caucasian × Some college 127.9
(139.2)
White or Caucasian × College graduate 3.194
(129.7)
White or Caucasian × Graduate or professional degree 36.75
(149.4)
Constant 1735.0∗∗∗ 1790.5∗∗∗ 1946.4∗∗∗
(36.82) (78.53) (76.77)
Observations 1187 1192 1193
Notes: The table presents the estimates from an OLS regression of Points in the race salient altruism
treatments on the employer’s race. The omitted employer is the Black employer. Column (1), (2), and
(3) test for the heterogeneity in treatment effects by gender, age, and education respectively. The
omitted categories for gender, age, and education are female, age between 18 and 24, and high school
or less. Standard errors in parentheses.
46
Table B6: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects - Altruism Treatments
(1) (2) (3)
Income Political Affiliation State Voting Pattern
White or Caucasian 26.40 -156.7∗ -32.94
(98.09) (71.10) (72.13)
Income $20,000 - $44,999 31.32
(85.53)
Income $45,000 - $99,999 42.77
(83.30)




White or Caucasian × Income $20,000 - $44,999 -185.3
(121.3)
White or Caucasian × Income $45,000 - $99,999 -110.1
(117.6)
White or Caucasian × Income $100,000 - $149,999 -33.72
(165.7)






White or Caucasian × Democrat 168.2
(95.54)






White or Caucasian × Red -212.3
(115.3)
White or Caucasian × Swing -31.55
(91.68)
Constant 1763.5∗∗∗ 1830.7∗∗∗ 1732.9∗∗∗
(69.71) (49.26) (50.37)
Observations 1167 1171 1193
Notes: The table presents the estimates from an OLS regression of Points in the race salient altruism
treatments on the employer’s race. The omitted employer is the Black employer. Column (1), (2), and
(3) test for the heterogeneity in treatment effects by income, political affiliation, and the voting pattern
of the most lived state (red, blue, or swing) of the worker, respectively. The omitted categories for
income, political affiliation, and state voting pattern are less than $20,000, democrat, and blue state.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B7: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects - Reciprocity Treatments
(1) (2) (3)
Gender Age Education




White or Caucasian × Male -113.1
(81.06)
Age 25 - 34 -100.2
(89.40)
Age 35 - 44 -119.0
(95.48)
Age 45 - 54 -216.9∗
(109.7)
Age 55 - 64 -319.6∗
(131.3)
Age 65 or older -520.6∗∗
(167.4)
White or Caucasian × Age 25 - 34 24.34
(129.5)
White or Caucasian × Age 35 - 44 -4.573
(136.9)
White or Caucasian × Age 45 - 54 -63.38
(156.9)
White or Caucasian × Age 55 - 64 -110.6
(180.6)






Graduate or professional degree -24.39
(100.4)
White or Caucasian × Some college -117.5
(135.9)
White or Caucasian × College graduate -63.39
(129.5)
White or Caucasian × Graduate or professional degree -42.49
(149.5)
Constant 1731.1∗∗∗ 1941.5∗∗∗ 1747.4∗∗∗
(37.40) (77.08) (77.05)
Observations 1170 1176 1178
Notes: The table presents the estimates from an OLS regression of Points in the race salient reciprocity
treatments on the employer’s race. The omitted employer is the Black employer. Column (1), (2), and
(3) test for the heterogeneity in treatment effects by gender, age, and education respectively. The
omitted categories for gender, age, and education are female, age between 18 and 24, and high school
or less. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects - Reciprocity Treatments
(1) (2) (3)
Income Political Affiliation State Voting Pattern
White or Caucasian 85.03 49.63 -67.15
(100.9) (62.58) (72.69)
Income $20,000 - $44,999 15.20
(88.56)
Income $45,000 - $99,999 100.2
(86.06)




White or Caucasian × Income $20,000 - $44,999 37.44
(123.4)
White or Caucasian × Income $45,000 - $99,999 -195.8
(119.2)
White or Caucasian × Income $100,000 - $149,999 -325.6
(170.2)






White or Caucasian × Independent -127.8
(94.79)






White or Caucasian × Red 89.20
(117.8)
White or Caucasian × Swing 86.19
(91.82)
Constant 1752.3∗∗∗ 1729.4∗∗∗ 1793.2∗∗∗
(73.27) (44.43) (50.53)
Observations 1161 1149 1179
Notes: The table presents the estimates from an OLS regression of Points in the race salient reciprocity
treatments on the employer’s race. The omitted employer is the Black employer. Column (1), (2), and
(3) test for the heterogeneity in treatment effects by income, political affiliation, and the voting pattern
of the most lived state (red, blue, or swing) of the worker respectively. The omitted categories for
income, political affiliation, and state voting pattern are less than $20,000, democrat, and blue state.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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65 and over -356.25 (58.48)
Education
Some college 1.78 (29.12)
College graduate -96.92 (28.06)
Graduate or professional degree -97.23 (32.92)
Prefer not to answer -1260.07 (472.82)
Income
$20,000 - $44,999 33.00 (25.98)
$45,000 - $99,999 40.73 (26.24)












Notes: The table presents the estimates of an OLS regression of points scored on worker demographics.




Consent for Participation in Research
Title of Study: Decisions in Labor Market
Investigator: Sher Afghan Asad, Ritwik Banerjee, Joydeep Bhattacharya
This brief screener is a part of a research project at Iowa State University. You will receive $0.05 
for completing the screener, which is used to see if you are eligible for the full study. Individuals 
who qualify for the study will be invited to participate in a 15-minute study for the pay of 1 dollar 
plus bonus. If you do not qualify for participation based on this screening questionnaire, all the 
information about you will be destroyed.
Description of Procedures
To be considered for participation in the study, you will have to answer a few demographic 
questions. Once you have answered those questions, you may be invited to participate in the full 
study. In the full study, you may be randomly matched with another participant and you will 
then work on a simple task that may affect your and your matched participant earnings. The 
experiment will last for approximately 15 minutes. You will be given more information about the 
structure of the study in the instructions.
Risks or Discomforts
There are no foreseeable risks currently in participating in the study. 
Benefits
If you decide to participate in this study, there are no direct benefits to you. It is hoped that the 
information gained in this study will benefit the field of economics by providing more insight 
into the process of how decisions are made in the labor markets.
Costs and Compensation 
You will not bear any costs from participating in this study. If you participate you will spend no 
longer than 15 minutes completing procedures. Participants will earn $1 for participating in the 
experiment and a bonus amount depending on the decisions in the experiment. Your final 




Participating in this study is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part in the study 
or to stop participating at any time, for any reason, without penalty or negative consequences. If 
you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related injury, please 
contact the IRB Administrator, 515-294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, 515-294-3115, 
Office for Responsible Research, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011.
Confidentiality 
This consent form and any other documents identifying participants will be kept confidential to 
the extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available. 
However, federal government regulatory agencies, auditing departments of Iowa State 
University, and the Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves human 
subject research studies) may inspect and/or copy study records for quality assurance and data 
analysis. These records may contain private information. This experiment is approved by the 
Institutional Review Board at Iowa State University (ISU IRB: 18-201-01, Approved Date: 
03/25/2019, Expiration Date: 07/17/2020). It is assured that the confidentiality of your data 
and the choices that you make in the study will be strictly maintained. To ensure confidentiality 
to the extent permitted by law, the following measures will be taken: Data will be stored on a 
secure cloud-based drive (Dropbox) under password protection. Your identifiable information 
will be separated from your decisions in the experiment. When we report results, we will group 
responses in aggregate; individual responses will not be shared. Please be aware that any work 
performed on Amazon MTurk can potentially be linked to information about you on your 
Amazon profile. We will not be accessing any information about you that you may have put on 
your Amazon public profile page. We will store your MTurk worker ID separately from the other 
information you provide to us.
Future Use of Data 
De-identified information collected about you during this study may be shared with other 
researchers or used for future research studies. We will not obtain additional informed consent 
from you before sharing the de-identified data.
Questions 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study. For further information 
about the study, contact Sher Afghan Asad at 515-735-6309 or saasad@iastate.edu or Joydeep 
Bhattacharya at joydeep@iastate.edu.
Consent and Authorization Provisions 
By clicking the box below, you acknowledge, that you voluntarily agree to participate in this 
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study, that the study has been explained to you, that you have been given the time to read the 
document, and that your questions have been satisfactorily answered. You may print a copy of 
this informed consent document for your records. 
If you don't agree with this consent document, then close this form and return the HIT.
I acknowledge that I have read the material above and I agree to participate in the study.
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Thank you for participating. Now that you have started, you may not restart this survey at 
any point or else your HIT will be rejected.
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.
Gender you most closely identify with: 




Prefer not to answer
Other
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
White or Caucasian









Prefer not to answer
Subjects who consent to participating in the study will fill out this screener 
survey before being considered for participation in this study. 
If “White or Caucasian” is not selected, 
survey will end with 5 cents compensation.
If "Under 18" is selected, survey will end 
with 5 cents compensation.
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Highest education level reached:
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or something else?
Annual pre-tax income
In which US state have you resided the longest?
Less than high school
High school or equivalent
























Congratulations! You meet the criteria to participate in the full study.
This study will take up to 10 minutes, pay a bonus of 1 dollar and possibly an additional amount 
depending on your decisions in the study.
Make sure that you are not distracted for the next 10 minutes. Once you click next, you may not 
restart this study at any point or else your HIT will be rejected. When you are ready, click next to 
begin.
You may have to click the next button multiple times to move forward.
Subjects who report their race as "White or Caucasian", age as above 18, and their device type 
is not mobile will be shown the following screen. Rest of them will be shown the exit screen with 
5 cents compensation.
Participants will be blocked randomized to one of the ten treatments when they click next. 
Instructions for each treatment will be explained in the video.  
 
The script of each video will differ only on the incentive and bonus structure, the video 
format will be same for each treatment. The video will only show the hands of the other 
participant demonstrating the task. The skin will be revealed/concealed (using gloves) in 
the video depending on the assigned treatment. The next few pages presents the 
interface for each treatment. 
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The following video explains what you are supposed to do in this study. You MUST watch this 
~1-minute video to continue with the study. 
The video has no sound, please carefully read the captions. 
Instructions
Below is an example of how the task will work. Try pressing `a' and `b' alternatively to score 
points. We have limited the point total below to a maximum of 5 as this is just practice, but the 
overall task will not have a limit.  
Press `a' then `b'...
Points: 0
Proceed to the next page when you are ready to play the task. Your 10-minute task will begin 
immediately when the page loads.
The next button will appear only after you have finished watching a video. PLEASE WATCH 
AND LISTEN TO THE VIDEO TO CONTINUE. 
Instructions for piece rate treatments. The videos have the 
hands covered in gloves and the audio is muted. 
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The following video explains what you are supposed to do in this study. You MUST watch this 
~1-minute video to continue with the study. 
The person in the video is another participant in the study. The video has no sound, please 
carefully read the captions. 
Instructions
The payment to the other participant will be paid in a couple of weeks. The proof of payment will 
be posted here. The ID of your other participant (assigned by us) is 18. 
Below is an example of how the task will work. Try pressing `a' and `b' alternatively to score 
points. We have limited the point total below to a maximum of 5 as this is just practice, but the 
overall task will not have a limit.  
Press `a' then `b'...
Points: 0
The next page will ask you some questions about the other participant. You will play the task 
after answering those questions. 
The next button will appear only after you have finished watching a video. PLEASE WATCH 
AND LISTEN TO THE VIDEO TO CONTINUE. 
Instructions for race neutral treatments. The videos have 
the hands covered in gloves and the audio is muted. 
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The following video explains what you are supposed to do in this study. You MUST watch this 
~1-minute video to continue with the study. 
The person in the video is another participant in the study. 
Instructions
The payment to the other participant will be paid in a couple of weeks. The proof of payment will 
be posted here. The ID of your other participant (assigned by us) is 62. 
Below is an example of how the task will work. Try pressing `a' and `b' alternatively to score 
points. We have limited the point total below to a maximum of 5 as this is just practice, but the 
overall task will not have a limit.  
Press `a' then `b'...
Points: 0
The next page will ask you some questions about the other participant. You will play the task 
after answering those questions. 
The next button will appear only after you have finished watching a video. PLEASE WATCH 
AND LISTEN TO THE VIDEO TO CONTINUE. 
Instructions for race salient treatments. The videos have 
the bare hands and the audio is not muted. 
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Before you play the task, please give your best guess about the participant in the video. For 
each question, you will be paid an extra 2 cents as bonus if your guess is correct, we 
will deduct 2 cents from your final bonus payment if your guess is incorrect. Select "Cannot 
decide" if you cannot decide between the two options, in which case no extra amount will be 
rewarded or deducted for that question. 
The other participant is either male or female, please guess the gender of the other participant? 
The other participant's income is either less than or greater than $45,000, please guess the 
income of the other participant?  
The other participant's education is either 'below college' or 'some college or above', please guess 
the highest education level attained by the other participant.  








Some college or above
Cannot decide
Black or African American
White or Caucasian
Cannot decide




The other participant is either 'under 35' or '35 or above', please guess the age group of the the 
other participant? 
Proceed to the next page when you are ready to play the task. Your 10-minute task will begin 





Press 'a' then 'b'...
Points: 155
Your bonus payout: $1 
Other participant's earning: $ 0.016
The other participant will be paid 1 cent for every 100 points that you score. 
Your score will not affect your payment in any way. 
Demonstration of the task by the other participant
This page will automatically submit after 10 minutes are over. Do NOT refresh / reload this 
page. 
Task screen for Altruism Black treatment
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Press 'a' then 'b'...
Points: 110
Your bonus payout: $1 
Other participant's earning: $ 0.011
The other participant will be paid 1 cent for every 100 points that you score. 
Your score will not affect your payment in any way. 
Demonstration of the task by the other participant
This page will automatically submit after 10 minutes are over. Do NOT refresh / reload this 
page. 
Task screen for Altruism Neutral treatment
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Press 'a' then 'b'...
Points: 132
Your bonus payout: $1 
Other participant's earning: $ 0.013
The other participant will be paid 1 cent for every 100 points that you score. 
Your score will not affect your payment in any way. 
Demonstration of the task by the other participant
This page will automatically submit after 10 minutes are over. Do NOT refresh / reload this 
page. 
Task screen for Altruism White treatment
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Press 'a' then 'b'...
Points: 57
Your bonus payout: $1 
Your score will not affect your payment in any way. 
Demonstration of the task
This page will automatically submit after 10 minutes are over. Do NOT refresh / reload this 
page. 
Task screen for Piece Rate - 0 cents treatment
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Press 'a' then 'b'...
Points: 44  
Your bonus payout: $1 + 0.013
As a bonus, you will be paid an extra 3 cents for every 100 points that you score. 
Demonstration of the task
This page will automatically submit after 10 minutes are over. Do NOT refresh / reload this 
page. 
3
Task screen for Piece Rate - 3 cents treatment
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Press 'a' then 'b'...
Points: 38  
Your bonus payout: $1 + 0.023
As a bonus, you will be paid an extra 6 cents for every 100 points that you score. 
Demonstration of the task
This page will automatically submit after 10 minutes are over. Do NOT refresh / reload this 
page. 
0
Task screen for Piece Rate - 6 cents treatment
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Press 'a' then 'b'...
Points: 68  
Your bonus payout: $1 + 0.061
As a bonus, you will be paid an extra 9 cents for every 100 points that you score. 
Demonstration of the task
This page will automatically submit after 10 minutes are over. Do NOT refresh / reload this 
page. 
Task screen for Piece Rate - 9 cents treatment
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Press 'a' then 'b'...
Points: 117
Your bonus payout: $1 + 0.2
Other participant's earning: $ 0.012
The other participant will be paid 1 cent for every 100 points that you score. 
In appreciation to you for performing this task, the other participant has decided 
to pay you an extra 20 cents as a bonus.
Your score will not affect your payment in any way. 
Demonstration of the task by the other participant
This page will automatically submit after 10 minutes are over. Do NOT refresh / reload this 
page. 
Task screen for Reciprocity Black treatment
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Press 'a' then 'b'...
Points: 114
Your bonus payout: $1 + 0.2
Other participant's earning: $ 0.011
The other participant will be paid 1 cent for every 100 points that you score. 
In appreciation to you for performing this task, the other participant has decided 
to pay you an extra 20 cents as a bonus.
Your score will not affect your payment in any way. 
Demonstration of the task by the other participant
This page will automatically submit after 10 minutes are over. Do NOT refresh / reload this 
page. 
Task screen for Reciprocity Neutral treatment
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Press 'a' then 'b'...
Points: 138
Your bonus payout: $1 + 0.2
Other participant's earning: $ 0.014
The other participant will be paid 1 cent for every 100 points that you score. 
In appreciation to you for performing this task, the other participant has decided 
to pay you an extra 20 cents as a bonus.
Your score will not affect your payment in any way. 
Demonstration of the task by the other participant
This page will automatically submit after 10 minutes are over. Do NOT refresh / reload this 
page. 
Task screen for Reciprocity White treatment
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Here is the summary of what happened in the experiment.
Points Scored: 38    
Your Bonus Payout: $1.023    
Please note that any bonus payment must be approved before they are given. Your bonus 
amount (if any) will be paid in 24 hours.  
Did you have any questions, concerns or comments about this study? If so, enter them here.:
On the next screen, you will be given a survey code that you must enter into the textbox on 
Mechanical Turk to get paid.
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Thank you for participating in this study. 
Your MTurk completion code is: 28377
It is very important that you do not share any of your results and that you do not provide any 
details about this study to other potential participants. We trust in you to keep this study and 
your results confidential.
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